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The Poverty of Political Culture * 
Robert W. Jackman, University of California, Davis 
Ross A. Miller, Santa Clara University 
The analyses reported by Granato, Inglehart, and Leblang (1996; here- 
after GIL) are a major improvement over the studies that we examined 
in our paper. Especially notable is their explicit evaluation of the cultural 
explanation against a major rival, as represented by endogenous growth 
models of scholars like Barro (1991), Levine and Renelt (1992), and Helli- 
well (1994). These models regress economic growth rates over a given 
period on a set of initial economic, human capital, and other variables. It 
is in the context of such models that GIL report a significant, independent 
effect of culture on growth. 
GIL's attention to the robustness of their estimates contrasts sharply 
with the studies evaluated in Jackman and Miller (1996). Their analysis 
departs from recent treatments in another way. In contrast o Inglehart 
(1990), for example, who examines the seven different components of cul- 
ture that we discuss, GIL restrict their attention tojust two: postmaterialism 
and achievement motivation. They find that only achievement motivation 
affects growth, which serves as the basis for their conclusion about the 
importance of culture. In this sense, their work stands as a key amendment 
to recent studies with their emphasis on norms of trust, satisfaction, partici- 
pation, and the like and signals a return to earlier work, exemplified most 
notably by McClelland's studies of need for achievement (1961; 1963; 
McClelland and Winter 1969). Given the exclusion of the former norms 
from GIL's analysis, along with their eported nonresults for postmaterial- 
ism, we take it that they regard achievement motivation as the only "cul- 
tural" value affecting economic growth. This narrows the field a good deal.' 
While there is thus much to recommend their paper over previous work, 
GIL's conclusion is ultimately unconvincing, onboth theoretical nd em- 
pirical grounds. We address these areas in turn. 
*We would like to thank Donna Bahry, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Mary Jackman, Stephen 
Nicholson and Randolph Siverson for their helpful suggestions, and Duane Swank for sharing 
some of his data. We also acknowledge support from the Institute of Governmental Affairs 
and the Academic Senate, University of California, Davis. 
'Recall (from our Table 6) that Inglehart (1990) does not discuss achievement motiva- 
tion, but does address even other measures of cultural values. Since six of these are not 
addressed by GIL, we take it that they are not now seen as factors that might influence 
economic growth. Recall further (from our Table 6) that our own analysis indicated that 
postmaterialism, 1980, did not influence economic growth, 1980-88. 
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Theoretical Issues 
GIL's theoretical discussion hinges on a ritual invocation of Weber's 
(1958) argument about Protestantism, an argument hat is central to the 
cultural account (Jackman and Miller 1996; Fukuyama 1995, esp. chap. 
5).2 Among other things, GIL claim that: 
The cultures of virtually all preindustrial societies are hostile to social mobility 
and individual economic accumulation. Thus, both medieval Christianity and 
traditional Confucianism stigmatized profit-making a dentrepreneurship.... 
Preindustrial economies are zero-sum systems: they are characterized by little 
or no economic growth.... Weber's emphasis on the role of Protestantism 
seems to capture an important part of reality. The Protestant Reformation com- 
bined with the emergence of scientific logic broke the grip of the medieval 
Christian worldview on a significant part of Europe (1996, 608-10). 
Their essential story is thus as follows: Europe was economically stagnant 
throughout the Middle Ages and would have remained so, had it not been 
for the exogenous shock induced by the Reformation generally, and by 
Calvinism in particular. Absent that exogenous shock, economic activity in 
Europe could not have moved from one equilibrium (stagnation) to another 
(growth). 
This portrait is, however, inconsistent in every crucial respect with the 
record accumulated by historians ince at least 1945. Summarizing radi- 
cally, there is evidence of considerable technological change, some indi- 
genous and some borrowed from Asia, during the Middle Ages (i.e., the 
period from AD 500 to AD 1500). This innovation was of sufficient magni- 
tude to lead Gies and Gies (1994) to conclude that the Europe of 1500 
would have been unrecognizable to those who had lived at the beginning 
of the millennium. 
Second, there was a sustained pattern of economic growth during the 
Middle Ages, one that involved a general expansion of commerce, trading 
and banking, and a pattern in which the pre-Reformation Church partici- 
pated. Accompanied by population growth, this economic expansion may 
not have raised living standards from "high to higher," but the shift "from 
very low to less low" was nonetheless both sustained and remarkable 
(Reynolds 1961, 156). 
2For good measure, they also invoke Tawney (1926). This bracketing of Tawney and 
Weber is odd, however, given that Tawney argued (contrary toWeber) that religious activity 
was inherently inimical to economic growth. Thus, Tawney's explanation of economic 
growth after the Reformation emphasized the erosion of religious authority generally, not 
the emergence of doctrinal modifications as ociated with Calvinism or any other particular 
theology. 
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Third, the record indicates that Protestantism generally (especially Cal- 
vinism) did not place an unambiguous and overriding weight on achieve- 
ment norms. It is indeed difficult even to sustain a clear contrast between 
Calvinism, Lutheranism, and Catholicism in the importance that each 
attached to achievement norms. Thus, it is unclear how Protestantism (or
Calvinism) could even plausibly have been a principal stimulus that gener- 
ated capitalism. 
Fourth, there was an exogenous hock that affected patterns of eco- 
nomic growth, but this came as the Black Death (or Plague) and associated 
events, during which it is estimated that Europe lost at least one-third of 
its population, and after which land and grain prices plunged. Further, the 
Black Death occurred in the late Middle Ages (in the mid-fourteenth cen- 
tury), predating the changes with the Reformation that concerned Weber.3 
Weber's empirical nalysis, however, started with the fifteenth century. 
Not recognizing this as the tail of a trough in economic activity, he instead 
extrapolated back to the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, on the erroneous 
assumption that hey must have been "even more rudimentary and primi- 
tive" than the fifteenth (Gilchrist 1969, 126). Had he understood the fif- 
teenth century as the end of a trough, it might have become clear that the 
"new" forms of capitalist activity he attributed toCalvinist heology were 
in fact much less novel than they otherwise appeared. Weber's historical 
analysis thus suffers from the selection bias associated with censored time 
series (Geddes 1990), the censoring in this instance occurring atthe begin- 
ning of the series. Once this is recognized, the basis for GIL's initial prem- 
ise evaporates: their historical c aims summarized above are inaccurate in 
every key respect, as is their conclusion that "Weber is correct in arguing 
that the rise of Protestantism is a crucial event in modernizing Europe" 
(1996, 609). 
Empirical Issues 
GIL's dependent variable covers the years from 1960 through 1989, 
following Levine and Renelt (1992). Their data on initial GDP and on pri- 
mary and secondary school enrollment ratios are for 1960 ("the beginning 
3There is, of course, a voluminous literature that addresses these issues, the cumulative 
implications ofwhich undermine the empirical basis for Weber's historical thesis. The above 
discussion draws on Barrow (1990), Bossy (1985), Bridbury (1992), Britnell (1993a, 1993b), 
Britnell and Campbell (1995), Carus-Wilson (1967), Cipolla (1980), Cohen (1980), Day 
(1987), de Roover (1963, 1974), Epstein (1991), Gilchrist (1969), Gies and Gies (1972, 
1994), Hatcher (1986, 1994), Hunt (1994), Lehmann and Roth (1993), Lopez (1976), Mac- 
Kinnon (1988, 1994), McNeill (1977), Miller and Hatcher (1995), Outhwaite (1986), Persson 
(1988), Reynolds (1961), Samuelsson (1961), Titow (1994), Trevor-Roper (1972, esp. chap. 
1), White (1978), and Wright (1982). 
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of the time period," as GIL properly emphasize), while their data on invest- 
ment rates are averaged over the years from 1960 through 89. In stark 
contrast, data for the two measured components of cultural values are drawn 
from the World Values Survey for 1990. That these variables are measured 
for 1990 may not be obvious since it is reported only in the notes to GIL's 
Appendix Table 1. The subject is not broached elsewhere in the text and 
hence may escape those readers who make the usually plausible assumption 
that all the explanatory variables temporally predate the dependent vari- 
able.4 
Perhaps labelling Culture1990 as a "significant predictor" of 
Growth1960-89 (as do GIL) is less awkward than we believe. Indeed, were 
there vidence that the values at hand are largely time-invariant, theuse 
of Culture1990 as an approximate proxy for Culture,960 might be warranted. 
The evidence in Jackman and Miller (1996) indicates, however, that hese 
values can vary substantially over time, as a function of both long- and 
short-term patterns ( ee also Clarke and Dutt 1991; Clarke, Dutt, and Kor- 
nberg 1993; Duch and Taylor 1993; Abramson and Inglehart 1995). GIL 
themselves emphasize that "central elements of culture can and do 
change." If so, Culture1990 is an inadequate proxy for Culture1960, andGIL's 
empirical analysis is simply indefensible. A trait measured at timet cannot 
be used to explain an "outcome" measured at timet,1. 
At the same time, there is another way to evaluate GIL's argument. 
McClelland (1961, 90) provided ata on national levels of need for achieve- 
ment collected for 1950. These data are based on codings of themes empha- 
sized in textbooks read by children from second- through fourth-grade lev- 
els, and are fully discussed by McClelland (1961, chap. 3). The 1950 date 
for these figures is almost ideal for our purposes, as the children exposed 
to these readers circa 1950 would be adults and at least potential labor force 
members by 1960, and they would play an increasingly important role in 
economic patterns over the ensuing years, 1960-89. McClelland's 1950 
data are available for 19 of the 25 countries examined by GIL.s 
4A series of World Values Surveys were also carried out between 1981 and 1983, but 
this earlier series did not include seven of the 25 countries analyzed by GIL (Abramson and 
Inglehart 1995, 97-9). The seven countries not surveyed in 1981-83 are Austria, Brazil, 
China, India, Nigeria, Switzerland, and Turkey. 
5McClelland also reported need for achievement estimates for 1925. In fact, he was 
especially attentive to issues of temporal ordering. Consider the following: 
The estimates of n Achievement [1925] are positively correlated with subsequent eco- 
nomic growth and very significantly so.... On the other hand, n Achievement level 
as estimated from the 1950 readers is not related to previous economic growth. The 
difference inthe two sets of correlations is particularly important theoretically because 
it bears on the issue of economic determinism.... Marx appears to have been somewhat 
premature in dismissing psychology as a major determinant in history (McClelland 
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Table 1. Regressions of Economic Growth on Initial GDP, 
School Enrollment Ratios, Investment, and Need for 
Achievement Levels, 1950 [Coefficients (t-ratios); N = 19] 
Robust Median 
OLS Regression Regression 
GDP per capita, 1960 -.35 -.38 -.32 
(3.1) (4.8) (5.4) 
Primary education, 1960 1.66 1.22 1.03 
(1.6) (1.7) (1.6) 
Secondary education, 1960 2.57 2.29 2.16 
(3.5) (4.4) (5.4) 
Investment, 1960-89 9.49 10.85 10.13 
(2.7) (4.3) (5-9) 
Need for achievement, 1950 -.06 -.06 -.07 
(0.2) (0.3) (0.5) 
Constant - .65 - .24 - .09 
(0.5) (0.3) (0.2) 
R2 .61 n/a .55 
F-ratio 6.68 15.09 n/a 
Data are from Granato, Inglehart, and Leblang (1996, Appendix Table 1), and from McClel- 
land (1961, 90). All calculations are made with the STATA statistical package. 
Accordingly, Table 1 displays the estimates obtained when economic 
growth rates, 1960-89, are regressed on GDP per capita and school enroll- 
ment ratios, 1960, domestic investment, 1960-89, and McClelland's mea- 
sure of need for achievement, 1950. The first column shows the OLS esti- 
mates, while two alternative robust sets of estimates are shown in the 
remaining columns. These estimates employ GIL' s data, and the regression 
model closely matches their Table 1, model 3, except hat he N is 19 rather 
than 25. 
Comparing across columns, it is evident hat the estimates are quite 
robust, in the sense that they are similar across the different estimating 
procedures. Second, the core endogenous growth model performs well, 
even with the reduced number of cases. Only the coefficient estimates for 
primary school enrollments are of borderline statistical significance, with 
t-ratios just above 1.5 (note that hey remain correctly-signed). Third, and 
most imDortant. there is no evidence here of a need for achievement effect: 
1961, 93, italics in original). 
Even so, his conclusions are difficult tosustain in light of analyses like Barro (1991) and 
Levine and Renelt (1992). Among other things, McClelland relied heavily on zero-order 
correlations. 
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the relevant coefficient estimates are incorrectly signed and the t-ratios 
hover below 0.5. In other words, when achievement motivation is analyzed 
on the basis of a defensible temporal ordering of the measured variables, 
there is no evidence that it influences economic growth one way or the 
other. 
Given this noneffect, how can we account for the connection between 
growth, 1960-89, and values, 1990, described by GIL? This question is 
best addressed in terms of the alternative perspective sketched in Jackman 
and Miller (1996) that draws on analyses like Hirschman (1984) and Gam- 
betta (1993) that endogenize values. Recall that in GIL's analysis, achieve- 
ment motivation is gauged from a question asking respondents to rank 
"qualities which children can be encouraged to learn at home." It is said 
to increase directly with the proportion stressing "thrift, saving money and 
things," and "determination," while it also increases inversely with the 
proportion emphasizing the traditional social values of "obedience" and 
"religious faith." 
Our hypotheses are straightforward. First, economic growth generates 
higher levels of achievement motivation, thus defined, because it creates a 
climate where norms favoring saving and "determination" make sense. In 
contrast, saving is often suboptimal (and indeed there are fewer incentives 
for saving) in periods of poor economic performance with their typically 
higher rates of inflation and unemployment.6 Second, investment in human 
capital generates higher levels of such achievement motivation insofar as 
it fosters the diffusion of achievement-oriented norms and undermines more 
"traditional" social values. We anticipate this effect o be most pronounced 
with investment in secondary (as opposed to primary) education, the clien- 
tele for which is closer to adulthood and thus closer to entering the labor 
force. 
These two hypotheses are readily evaluated using the data reported by 
GIL in their Appendix Table 1. Table 2 displays estimates obtained when 
achievement motivations, 1990, are regressed on economic growth rates, 
1960-89, and school enrollment ratios, 1960. The OLS estimates in the 
first column of the table are consistent with both hypotheses. Economic 
growth has the most pronounced positive effect, and has a t-ratio consider- 
ably greater than 2.0. Both of the estimates for school enrollment ratios 
are positive, except that the primary school enrollment coefficient is smaller 
than its standard error. The t-ratio for the secondary enrollment coefficient 
is greater than 2.0, and the estimated coefficient itself is four times the 
size of that for primary enrollment (these two right-hand variables share a 
6GIL recognize the "possibility that economic growth might be conducive to thrift," 
but assert hat he rationale for such an argument is "less obvious." The assertion ispuzzling. 
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Table 2. Regressions of Need for Achievement, 1990, on Prior 
Economic Growth and Initial School Enrollment Ratios 
[Coefficients (t-ratios); N = 25] 
Robust Median 
OLS Regression Regression 
Economic growth, 1960-89 .22 .19 .17 
(4.8) (3.6) (3.6) 
Primary education, 1960 .20 .21 .15 
(0.7) (0.6) (0.5) 
Secondary education, 1960 .81 .88 .95 
(2.9) (2.6) (2.7) 
Constant -1.16 -1.14 -1.08 
(4.2) (3.4) (3.4) 
R2 .69 n/a 44 
F-ratio 15.45 10.12 n/a 
Data are from Granato, Inglehart, and Leblang (1996, Appendix Table 1). 
common metric). Overall, this simple model fits the data quite well (the 
adjusted R2 is .64 and the SEE is .28). Columns three and four of the table 
display robust estimates for the model, and show that the parameter esti- 
mates are relatively stable across different estimators. 
Before we embrace the proposition that "achievement norms" are the 
phenomenon generated by the explanatory variables in Table 2, however, 
one remaining empirical issue warrants clarification. The measure em- 
ployed by GIL is generated from aggregate responses to only four of the 
11 items listed in the Appendix below. Specifically, GIL (a) sum the per- 
centage of respondents in each country emphasizing the virtues of "thrift, 
saving money and things" and "determination," (b) sum the percentage 
of respondents tressing "obedience" and "religious faith," and then sub- 
tract (b) from (a). The implicit assumption here, of course, is that these 
four items constitute a single coherent cluster of attitudes across and within 
countries, so that a high country score indicates that there are many individ- 
uals who attach a high value to thrift and determination and who simulta- 
neously place much less weight on obedience and religious faith, etc. How 
reasonable is this assumption? 
The first column of Table 3 displays the loadings from a principal com- 
ponents analysis of the four measures of achievement motivation for the 
25 cases examined by GIL. These estimates provide some apparent evi- 
dence for a relatively coherent cluster of attitudes, as the first factor has 
an eigenvalue of 2.48, and no additional factors with eigenvalues greater 
than 1.0 are extracted. The loadings for the first wo measures (thrift and 
CO~~~~~~~~~I 
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determination) have the same sign (negative) and are relatively strong 
(-.82 and -.61, respectively). The loadings for the third and fourth mea- 
sures (religion and obedience) are also in the expected direction (positive) 
and quite high (.84 and .85, in turn). The substantive interpretation ofthe 
factor in the first column appears consistent, moreover, with GIL's argu- 
ment: a country with a high factor score is one where citizens attach less 
importance to thrift and determination and place more weight on religion 
and obedience. 
Unfortunately, we find very little evidence of comparable patterns 
within these same 25 countries. In fact, in only three cases (India, Nigeria, 
and South Africa) do we find the same pattern. To illustrate, the estimates 
for Nigeria are shown in the second column, and suggest a single-factor 
solution. While the loadings are weaker than those found in the aggregate 
analysis (not surprisingly, given that these involve individual-level data), 
the four items do cluster similarly in the Nigerian and aggregate analyses. 
For 22 of the 25 countries, however, there is no such structure across 
the four items, and in fully 17 of these 25 cases, a two-factor solution is 
warranted (i.e., there are two components with eigenvalues > 1.0). The 
remaining three columns in Table 3 illustrate the diversity of factor solu- 
tions. In both France and Mexico, for example, we obtain a two-factor 
solution, where thrift and determination cluster into one factor and religion 
and obedience cluster into another, and where the loadings for thrift and 
determination are of opposite signs! For Norway, in contrast, we do esti- 
mate a single-factor solution: however, the loadings are incorrectly-signed 
(given GIL's argument), and only one exceeds .60. At the individual evel, 
then, these four items fail to cluster into the single coherent dimension 
anticipated by GIL for almost all of the cases that they consider. 
Finally, recall that the four items examined in Table 3 are a subset of 
the 11 items listed in our Appendix. The principles guiding GIL's selection 
of this subset are, however, unclear. Why, for example, is "determination 
and perseverance" included as part of the achievement syndrome when 
"hard work" and "feeling of responsibility" are not? To save space, we 
do not display the estimates here, but a component analysis of all 11 (aggre- 
gated) items across all 25 cases generates three factors. Further, the rotated 
(varimax) loadings have "hard work" on the second component (along 
with "imagination" and "tolerance"), and thus counterintuitively treat 
"hard work" as distinct from "determination." The corresponding compo- 
nent analyses of all 11 items within each of the 25 countries generate a 
considerable miscellany of solutions, few of which are amenable to a clear 
substantive interpretation. 
We emphasize in Jackman and Miller (1996) that the core of the politi- 
cal culture account addresses the prevalence of value clusters within coun- 
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tries, clusters that assume political and social meaning insofar as they are 
widely shared across individuals. There is no evidence of any such coher- 
ent clustering in GIL' s data to warrant either their narrower claims 
about achievement motivation or their broader claims about political cul- 
ture. 
Summary 
GIL's argument hat culture drives economic growth is unconvincing. 
First, like most such claims, it is predicated on Weber's explication of a role 
for Protestantism ineconomic growth, one belied by the historical evidence. 
Second, GIL's empirical analyses are fatally flawed. Specifically, 
(a) the measure of their principal explanatory variable constitutes an 
ex post "predictor;" 
(b) an ex ante measure of achievement motivation has no systematic 
effect on subsequent economic growth; 
(c) evidence suggests that their measure of culture is more profitably 
cast as an outcome of economic growth; and 
(d) the meaning of that measure of culture is obscure (GIL to the con- 
trary, it certainly cannot be interpreted as a unidimensional gauge 
of achievement motivations). 
Swank's Commentary 
Remarkably, Swank does not address any of the theoretical or empirical 
issues discussed above.7 While the bulk of his comments concern culture 
and economic growth, Swank addresses our reanalysis of Putnam (1993) 
in only two paragraphs, and his brief discussion distorts what we say. For 
example, Swank notwithstanding, we do not "suggest through principal 
components analysis at least four dimensions of [institutional] perfor- 
mance" (1996, 666). Instead, we employ the identical data and estimating 
procedures as Putnam to demonstrate that he confuses assumptions with 
conclusions, and that absent his strong assumptions there is no basis for 
7To be sure, Swank does acknowledge that the dating of GIL's measure of need for 
achievement may be an issue. This acknowledgement comes only in his footnote 4,however, 
and Swank obviously fails to recognize the gravity of the problem. Thus, he proceeds as if 
GIL's dating of their key independent variable were not an issue (as in the first two columns 
of his Table 1 and the surrounding discussion). Further, Swank to the contrary, neither our 
discussion or GIL's "suggests that his variable [need for achievement] will be somewhat 
stable overtime" (Swank 1996, footnote 4). 
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those conclusions.8 The point is simple, fundamental, and inescapable. Put- 
nam's analysis fails on its own terms.9 
Most of Swank's commentary centers on the impact on growth of 
"communitarian politics." Ignoring his own admonition to avoid "single- 
equation, linear models of what theoretically is a multifaceted, complex 
relationship" (665), Swank proceeds to estimate such models in which 
communitarianism is represented by "corporatism" and "Confucianism." 
We briefly discuss these in turn. 
Corporatism 
Swank is selective in his discussion of social corporatism, and creates 
the false impression that there is a measure of agreement about linkages 
between corporatism and economic growth. Thus, he cites Lange and Gar- 
rett (1985) to this effect, but ignores the criticism in Jackman (1987). Simi- 
larly, he mentions Hicks, who declared that with the addition of "several 
key control variables" the Lange-Garrett model is "robust" (Hicks 1988, 
677), but ignores the fact that Hick's model is overfitted and has meager 
degrees of freedom (Jackman 1989). Problems of robustness also plague 
the claims about corporatism advanced in Swank (1992), as shown by Beck 
and Katz (1995), but Swank cites only the former source. 
In addition to this selectivity, Swank's measure of corporatism is weak. 
While he opines that culture is "multifaceted," he actually relies on a sim- 
ple dummy variable to reflect he presence of communitarian values. This 
is too blunt an instrument to measure adequately the "clusters of values, 
attitudes, and norms that support, and are reinforced if not facilitated by, 
8Thus, our purpose has been to show that Putnam's own data do not warrant the conclu- 
sions he draws. We do not mean to suggest, however, that his is the only basis for criticism 
of his inferences. For example, Putnam traces regional differences ingovernance during the 
1 980s back to patterns of civic engagement a the end of the last century, and often to much 
earlier civic traits. One reasonably wonders how he would have proceeded had he been 
investigating regional differences in governance during the Mussolini period, i.e., the 1930s. 
What patterns of civic (dis)engagement would these have reflected, and when exactly would 
those patterns have been manifested? 
9Swank's comments about specification are completely extraneous. In our reanalysis, 
we include Putnam's indicator of economic development. This comes from a principal com- 
ponents analysis of six elements: net income per capita, 1972; gross domestic product per 
capita, 1970; the size, respectively, ofthe agricultural and industrial workforces, 1977; and 
the value added share, respectively, for agriculture and industry 1979. In light of the endoge- 
nous growth and related empirical models such as those we have discussed, it is evident 
that each of these elements provides evidence on patterns of physical capital and investment 
within Italy's regions. 
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institutions, policies and practices," all part of a complex whole that Swank 
claims constitute a core explanatory variable (1996, 667). 
Finally, Swank provides no evidence beyond a vague reference to the 
"extant literature" (1996, 672) to support his classification for fully half 
of the noncorporatist states (his Appendix shows missing data for 10 of 
these 20 cases). Given this lack of evidence, coupled with the crudeness 
of Swank's index of social corporatism, one wonders how he developed 
his classification. 
Confucianism 
We noted in Jackman and Miller (1996) the tendency toward ex post 
explanation in the cultural account. In his evaluation of a related cultural 
interpretation ofdevelopment, Billig clearly states the problem: 
The view of culture xpressed by the new cultural determinists tends to be 
the static, synchronic version beyond which anthropology has largely pro- 
gressed.... Note how the logic works: these words-authoritarian, i dividual- 
istic, present-time-focused, etc.-characterize this thing called Hispanic 
American culture and lead inexorably tomaladaptive types of economic activ- 
ity. These values and attitudes exist in the shared consciousness of Hispanic 
Americans and result in a business ethos that obstructs he type of enterprise 
we see in more successful countries, presumably ones that have prior cultural 
traits that foster a better kind of economic activity. Since we have only recently 
become aware of what constitutes good kinds of activity, itmust be the case 
that those societies whose cultures encouraged that kind were pretty lucky; 
the others, well, let us hope their cultures are flexible nough to get with the 
program (1994, 661, italics in original). 
And so it is with Confucianism. Weber, of course, went to great lengths to 
distinguish Puritanism from Confucianism: "Confucian rationalism meant 
rational adjustment o the world; Puritan rationalism meant rational mastery 
of the world" (1951, 248). Indeed, to provide further substantiation of his 
argument in The Protestant Ethic, he devoted the entire last chapter of The 
Religion of China to the contrast between the two world views. The theme 
is echoed in more recent treatments. Thus, according to Pye: 
The Confucian ideal was eminently appropriate for an agrarian society but 
was detrimental o the development ofcommerce and industry. Eventually the 
Confucian tradition of distrust for all that might unsettle the agricultural order 
worked against he Chinese in their confrontation with the modem industrial 
and technologically oriented West (1991, 34). 
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A major difficulty with this description is that it squares poorly with 
the recent economic performance of many East Asian economies. There 
are, of course, different ways of resolving the dissonance thus introduced. 
One might, for example, conclude that there is no causal link between val- 
ues and economic growth. Another tack, perhaps more consistent with Fes- 
tinger (1957), involves an about-face on the content of Confucianism to 
render the latter consistent with the pattern of economic growth already 
observed. Such is the strategy proposed by pundits like Kahn and endorsed 
most recently by Swank: 
Most readers ... are familiar with the argument of Max Weber that he Protes- 
tant ethic was extremely useful in promoting the rise and spread of moderniza- 
tion. Most readers, however, will be much less familiar with the notion that 
has gradually emerged in the last two decades that societies based upon the 
Confucian ethic may in many ways be superior to the West in the pursuit of 
industrialization, affluence, and modernization (Kahn 1979, 121, italics ours). 
The "thing" labelled Confucianism is now refurbished as a pro-growth 
value system, and the basis for the East Asian economic "miracle" is thus 
revealed. The ex post reasoning here is glaring. 
Swank's Empirical Analyses 
There remains Swank's "theoretically driven empirical model," which 
he claims "does surprisingly well in explaining cross-national variations 
in economic growth rates and is robust in the face of alternative controls 
and statistical evaluations" (1996, 675). What can we learn from this 
model? 
Table 4 displays four sets of OLS estimates. The figures in column (1) 
contain the estimates for the baseline model of economic growth with which 
GIL began their analysis. Column (2) shows the estimates obtained when 
the two dummy variables for Corporatism and Confucianism proposed by 
Swank are added to the model, and are similar to those he reports in his 
Table 1, column (3), except that hey include insignificant parameter esti- 
mates for secondary enrollment ratios and investments. Comparing the two 
columns, we see that he coefficients for the two dummy variables are statis- 
tically significant beyond the .10 level (two-tailed test), and that heir addi- 
tion to the model improves its fit substantially (for example, the R2 increases 
from .63 to .87). This would appear strongly consistent with Swank's con- 
clusions. 
Recall that Swank's claim is that both Corporatism and Confucianism 
have separate, additive ffects on growth. As is shown in column (3) of 
Table 4, however, we find no evidence of a corporatism effect on growth 
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Table 4. OLS Regressions of Economic Growth on Initial GDP, 
School Enrollment Ratios, Investment, and 
Other Sundry Characteristics 
[Coefficients (t-ratios); N = 25] 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
GDP per capita, 1960 -.63 -.30 -.61 -.29 
(4.3) (2.7) (3.8) (3.3) 
Primary education, 1960 2.69 3.30 2.43 1.64 
(2.1) (3.9) (1.8) (2.0) 
Secondary education, 1960 3.25 .32 3.38 .45 
(3.2) (0.4) (3.2) (0.7) 
Investment, 1960-89 8.12 -1.41 10.13 2.53 
(1.8) (0.3) (1.8) (0.8) 
"Corporatism" .69 - .26 .34 
(1.8) (0.5) (I. 1) 
"Confucianism" 2.98 2.39 
(5.7) (5.4) 
"Failed Protestant colonies" -1.34 
(3.5) 
Constant -.72 .48 -.84 1.50 
(0.7) (0.7) (0.7) (2.3) 
R2 .63 .87 .64 .92 
F-ratio 8.58 20.10 6.64 29.76 
Data from Granato, Inglehart, and Leblang (1996, Appendix Table 1), and from Swank 
(1996). 
when the coefficient for Confucianism is constrained to zero: indeed, the 
applicable estimate is incorrectly signed and smaller than its standard error. 
A similar set of estimates is obtained when the set of Confucian economies 
is excluded from the analysis and the model in column (3) reestimated 
(figures not shown). Swank's estimates thus appear to be less robust than 
he believes, and a comparison of columns (2) and (3) in Table 4 suggests 
that "Confucianism" is the deus ex machina of his analysis. 
Further perspective on the issue comes from an additional variable. As 
Swank observes, the 25 economies under consideration encompass some 
non-Western economies. Among these are three former British colonies, 
within which there were considerable Protestant missionary efforts during 
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.10 Such efforts were ultimately 
unsuccessful, however, as most people in these colonies did not convert, 
"0The literature on these activities is extensive. See, e.g., Ajayi (1965), Du Plessis 
(191 1), Duvall (1928), Messmore (1903), Mitchell (1899), Ross (1986), and Stewart (1899). 
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thereby rejecting the entrepreneurial values highlighted by Weber. We 
would on the average thus expect lower growth rates in these economies. 
Column (4) of Table 4 reports the OLS estimates for a model con- 
taining a dummy variable that identifies these "failed Protestant colonies." 
Comparing these figures with those in column (2) shows that "Confucian- 
ism" still exerts a marked effect while the coefficient for "failed Protestant 
colonies" is also correctly signed with a t-ratio f 3.5. The fit for the model 
as a whole increases from .87 to .92, a statistically significant improvement. 
Following the logic of Swank's analysis, we might therefore conclude that 
both factors are important o a complete explanation of economic growth. 
Caution is in order, however. It is true that the three countries identified 
by Swank (China, Japan, and South Korea) are often labelled "Confucian," 
even though in religious terms Japan and Korea are not predominantly Con- 
fucian (e.g., Pye 1985). It is also true that the Protestant missions generally 
failed in the three countries we have identified (India, Nigeria, and South 
Africa), although Christianity in a more general sense has been successful 
in South Africa." These two binary variables are linked, however, in a more 
fundamental manner. The so-called "Confucianism" dummy actually 
identifies the three cases with the three highest scores on the dependent 
variable, namely, economic growth, 1960-89. Conversely, the dummy 
variable we have labelled "failed Protestant colonies" actually designates 
the three cases with the lowest rates of economic growth. These two "ex- 
planatory" variables are thus simply recoded versions of the dependent 
variable. 
Swank's analysis brings new meaning to the problem of selecting on 
extreme values of the dependent variable. The difficulty with selecting ob- 
servations for analysis on the basis of such values is well-known (e.g., 
Geddes 1990). Here, we are asked to go the next step. Identify a subset of 
such cases and give this subset a name (any name will do). Create a binary 
variable that equals one for cases in this subset, and zero otherwise, and 
include it on the right as an explanatory variable. Results are guaranteed, 
and indeed it is not surprising that "Confucianism" drives Swank's empiri- 
cal analysis. Whether or not these "Confucian" economies comprise the 
Elect in a Calvinist sense, then, they certainly are the Select. 
Our addition of a parameter for "failed Protestant colonies" (for want 
of a shorter term) serves simply to round out Swank's analysis and further 
improve the fit by taking care of those cases with low scores on the depen- 
dent variable. Under no circumstances, of course, do such efforts constitute 
"The three countries we have identified are unusual in another sense: they are the only 
three cases for which the components of need for achievement used by GIL cluster together 
in the manner anticipated by GIL, as we indicated above (705). 
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an explanation: economic growth is not usefully explained by itself. In- 
stead, Swank's analysis simply perpetuates the ex post tendencies typical of 
so many cultural accounts, and carries them to their inescapable conclusion. 
Conclusion 
In light of our evaluation of Inglehart (1990) and Putnam (1993) we 
argued that "further attempts to refine and test the case for political culture 
along the lines we have addressed seem unlikely to be productive" (Jack- 
man and Miller 1996, 654). As we have shown here, neither GIL's nor 
Swank's analyses offer any material evidence to the contrary. Instead, they 
serve solely to underscore our original conclusion. 
The most prominent problem with these analyses (one they share with 
many such analyses) is that they are ex post. This is an obvious issue with 
Swank's invocation of Confucianism as a growth-enhancing value (GIL 
also broach the question). Since he wishes to attribute the high rates of 
growth observed in the East Asian Newly-Industrializing Countries (NICs) 
to values, Swank summons a common "Confucian" culture as the explana- 
tion. While it is a little more masked, the same predicament plagues GIL's 
inquiry. It is thus unsurprising that each analysis is also ex post in opera- 
tional terms. GIL's key explanatory variable postdates the phenomenon 
they seek to explain, while Swank's key explanatory variable is simply a 
recoded version of his dependent variable. 
Both analyses exhibit a second general difficulty, although it is dis- 
played more directly by Swank. The ecumenical effort o find a middle 
ground between institutional nd cultural explanations is not apt to prove 
fruitful, because the two are incompatible. We are hardly the first o note 
the problem. In an insightful evaluation of revisionists, like Tawney (1926), 
who sought to modify the Weber thesis, Samuelsson pointed out that: 
Such writers, disposed to compromise, vidently believe that false concepts 
can be made into perfectly sensible ones simply by taking little bits of each 
an glueing them together into a "between-the-two" or "as-well-as" joinery 
of totally opposed notions (1961, 25). 
Weber, of course, fundamentally treated values as exogenous, and this 
is the distinctive lement of the "value enactment" approach (Portes 1976). 
Analyses like Putnam's, Inglehart's, and Swank's follow very much in the 
same tradition. In sharp contrast, the institutional approach endogenizes 
values (e.g., Hirschman 1984; Knight 1992; Gambetta 1993). Because it 
makes no sense to think of values as being half exogenous, this difference 
cannot be split. 
We could, of course, continue to draw rabbits from the cultural hat. 
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The more fruitful strategy, however, involves institutional analyses that 
address two basic questions. First, how do procedures and rules structure 
the choices made by different political actors? Second, how does political 
conflict generate these procedures and rules? The analyses in this sympo- 
sium have given us no reason to depart from these fundamental political 
issues. 
Final manuscript received I December 1995. 
APPENDIX 
Survey Question from which "Achievement Orientations" 
are Generated 
Here is a list of qualities which children can be encouraged to learn at home. 
Which, if any, do you consider to be especially important? Please choose up to 
five. (CODE FIVE ONLY) 
A) Good manners 
B) Independence 
C) Hard work 
D) Feeling of responsibility 
E) Imagination 
F) Tolerance and respect for other people 
G) Thnift, saving money and things 
H) Determination, perseverance 
I) Religious faith 
J) Unselfishness 
K) Obedience 
Italicized items included in GIL's (1996) index of achievement motivation. 
Source: World Values Survey, 1990 (ICPSR study # 6160), variables #226-#236. 
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